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I.

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Washington Industrial Safety and
Health Act of 1973 (WISHA)' heralded a new era in the state's
employment law history. The Act reflected the state's growing
concern for the safety of its workers, a trend that has slowly
developed in both the Washington State Legislature and the
Washington Supreme Court.
At common law, employees of independent contractors were
unable to obtain compensation from the employer of the
independent contractor when they were injured on the job.2
Over time, the state legislature and courts whittled away at
this rule. A common law exception to the rule of nonliability
developed whereby the employer of the independent contractor
could be held liable if the employer retained control over some
part of the work.3 Washington courts later recognized an exception based on contract, where the employer of the independent
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1. Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act, ch. 80, 1973 Wash. Laws 212
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (1992)).
2. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274, 277, 635 P.2d
426, 428 (1981); Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85,94, 549 P.2d
483, 489 (1976); Seattle Aerie 1 v. Commissioner, 23 Wash. 2d 167, 171-72, 160 P.2d
614, 616 (1945); Bowen v. Smyth, 68 Wash. 513, 516, 123 P. 1016, 1017 (1912);
Campbell v. Jones, 60 Wash. 265, 267, 110 P. 1083, 1084 (1910); Larson v. American

Bridge Co., 40 Wash. 224, 228, 82 P. 294, 295 (1905); W.
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ative duty regarding safety measures on the job site.4 Meanwhile, the state legislature created a statutory exception under
which all employers on a job site had a duty to provide a safe
workplace and to comply with all applicable safety regulations.'
The Washington Supreme Court held that this duty extended to
all workers lawfully on the premises, including the employees of
other contractors.6
The passage of WISHA seemed to be another step in the
evolution of Washington employment law towards greater concern for the safety of workers. Worker safety was the stated
purpose of the Act,7 and the Act expressly provided 8 that all
safety standards enacted thereunder must equal or exceed
those prescribed by the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSH Act). 9
However, all three divisions of the Washington Court of
Appeals construed WISHA as placing new limits on the liability
of employers for job site injuries. 10 Their rulings contradicted
each other, the stated purpose of WISHA, and previous case
law. Adding to this confusion were Washington Supreme Court
rulings that construed the same provisions of WISHA but were
limited by their facts."
The confusion was ended, and the progress in providing
greater protection for workers was restored, by the Washington
Supreme Court in Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc.1 2 There, the court
held that general contractors on construction sites, because of
their innate supervisory authority, as a matter of law owe a
duty to all job site workers to comply with WISHA standards.'"
Subsequently, the appellate divisions extended this rule to
4. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 334, 582 P.2d 500,
507 (1978).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.16.030 (repealed 1973).
6. Bayne v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 917, 920, 568 P.2d 771, 773 (1977).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).
8. Id.
9. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988)).
10. Straw v. Esteem Constr. Co., Inc., 45 Wash. App. 869, 728 P.2d 1052 (Div. III
1986); Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 442, 711 P.2d 1090 (Div.
II 1985); Ward v. Ceco Corp., 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (Div. I), review denied,
104 Wash. 2d 859, 711 P.2d 310 (1985).
11. Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of America, 110 Wash. 2d 128, 750 P.2d 1257 (1988);
Goucher v. J. R. Simplot Co., 104 Wash. 2d 662, 709 P.2d 774 (1985).
12. 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
13. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550.
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14
owner/developers, 1 5 and ultiowner/general contractors,'
16
mately, all job site owners.
Although Stute appeared to resolve the issue of liability for
injuries resulting from WISHA violations, there are those who
question this reading of Stute and the extension of the Stute
rule by the courts of appeals. A recent Division Two case' 7 and
an article in this issue i" have expressed concern that uncertainty has been created by the Washington Supreme Court ruling in Hennig v. Crosby Group, Inc.,' 9 and by the Division One
ruling in Kennedy v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. 20 However, these
rulings, as they address only the general duty created by
WISHA, do not conflict with Stute and its progeny, which deal
with WISHA's specific duty clause.
This Article argues in support of the trend towards greater
protection for workers through the deterrent factor of certain
civil liability for WISHA violations resulting in injury. The
Article begins by charting the evolution of Washington law on
this issue. It then describes the current state of the law on this
subject. Finally, it explains how Stute and its progeny are in
line with the state's overall trend towards greater worker protection, consistent with the legislative intent of WISHA, and
beneficial to not only employees, but employers as well.

II.

EvoLUTION OF THE LAW OF JOB SITE LIABILITY

A.

Rule of Nonliability

The common law rule is that one who engages an independent contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from the contractor's work. 2 1 The reasoning behind this rule was that
because of the independence of the relationship between the
original contractor and the independent contractor, there was
14. Husfloen v. MTA Constr., Inc., 58 Wash. App. 686, 689, 794 P.2d 859, 861,
review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d 325 (1990).
15. Weinert v. Bronco Nat'l Co., 58 Wash. App. 692, 696, 795 P.2d 1167, 1170
(1990).
16. Doss v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 125, 128-29, 803 P.2d 4, 6, review
denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991).
17. George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 67 Wash.
App. 468, 473, 836 P.2d 851, 853 (1992).
18. Gregory J. Duff, Comment, Job Site Safety in Washington: Requiring Actual
Control When Imposing Statutory Duties on Job Site Owners, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 355 (1994).
19. 116 Wash. 2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991).
20. 62 Wash. App. 839, 816 P.2d 75 (1991).
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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no privity between the original contractor and injured persons.12 In the case of injured employees, the relation of master
and servant does not exist between the original contractor and
the employee. 23 The independence of the independent contractor, then, is the key to the rule of nonliability.
B.

Exceptions to the Rule of Nonliability
1.

Common Law

Over time, Washington courts have recognized exceptions
to the rule of nonliability based on common law, statute, and
contractual assumption of duty.2 4 A common law exception
exists where the employer of the independent contractor retains
control over some part of the work. The employer has a duty,
within the scope of that control, to provide a safe place to
work.2 5
The test of control is not the actual interference with the
work of the contractor, but the right to exercise such control.2 6
The employer may, however, retain some control, so long as it is
less than that which is necessary to subject it to liability as a
master. A reservation of the right to supervise work to determine whether it is being done in accordance with the contract is
not enough to subject the employer to liability.27 For the control
exception to apply, the employer must retain at least some
degree of control over the manner in which the work is done.28
As independence is the key to the general rule of nonliability, it is also the key to the control exception. When the
employer retains the right to control the work method, it vitiates the independence of the contractor, creating privity
between itself and the employees of the contractor.29
The control exception remained constant in this state for
many years.30 In 1978, however, the Washington Supreme
22. Larson v. American Bridge Co., 40 Wash. 224, 228, 82 P. 294, 295 (1905).
23. Id.
24. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 330, 582 P.2d 500,
505 (1978).
25. Fenimore v. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 94, 549 P.2d 483, 489 (1976).
26. Fardig v. Reynolds, 55 Wash. 2d 540, 544, 348 P.2d 661, 663 (1960).
27. Larson, 40 Wash. at 228, 82 P. at 295; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414
cmt. c (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965).

29. See Larson, 40 Wash. at 228, 82 P. at 295.
30. See Fenimore v. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 549 P.2d 483 (1976);
Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 399 P.2d 591 (1965); Greenleaf v. Puget Sound
Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wash. 2d 647, 364 P.2d 796 (1961); Fardig,55 Wash. 2d at
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Court heard Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Construction, Co.3 1 In
Kelley, a worker employed by a subcontractor was injured on a
construction project and sought to recover damages from the
general contractor.32 The worker argued that the general contractor was under a duty to comply with Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations (the worker's
injuries occurred prior to the passage of WISHA), and that its
negligent failure to comply resulted in his injury. 33 The defendbecause he
ant argued that it owed no such duty to the worker,
34
was an employee of an independent contractor.
The trial court instructed the jury in line with the plaintiffs theories of liability. 35 The jury found the defendant negligent and the worker ten percent contributorily negligent. 6 The
defendant appealed.
On appeal, the worker argued that the defendant's duty to
comply with OSHA regulations arose from any one of several
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability.3 7 These exceptions were based in common law, statute, and contract.38
In determining whether the common law exception of control applied, the Washington Supreme Court expanded the longconstant doctrine, holding that a general contractor's "general
supervisory functions" were per se control. 39 In so holding, the
court relied on the reasoning used by the Michigan Supreme
Court in the seminal case of Funk v. General Motors Corp.4 °
Both courts noted the real threat of injury on construction sites
and reasoned that the best way to ensure that safety precautions are taken is to make the general contractor ultimately
responsible because the general contractor has the authority to
require such precautions. 4 This was, essentially, the first
change in Washington job site liability common law in over seventy years.
540, 348 P.2d at 661; Scheiber v. Grigsby, 28 Wash. 2d 322, 182 P.2d 745 (1947); Bill v.

Gattavara, 24 Wash. 2d 819, 167 P.2d 434 (1946).
31. 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
32. Id. at 325, 582 P.2d at 502.
33. Id. at 328, 582 P.2d at 504.
34. Id. at 325, 582 P.2d at 502.
35. Id. at 328, 582 P.2d at 504.
36. Id. at 325, 582 P.2d at 502.
37. Id. at 330, 582 P.2d at 505.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 331, 582 P.2d at 505.
40. 220 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1974).
41. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 331-32, 582 P.2d at 505 (citing Funk, 220 N.W.2d at
646).
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Contract

Another change in Washington law was made in Kelley.
This change concerned contract law, but its practical effect was
in the area of job site liability. One of the worker's arguments
on appeal was that the defendant, by assuming responsibility
for job site safety in its contract with the job site owner, contractually assumed a duty to comply with OSHA regulations.4 2 The
defendant argued that liability could not be based on the contract because the worker was not a party to it. 43 The court disagreed, ruling that an affirmative duty assumed by contract
may create a liability to persons not party to the contract, where
failure to properly perform the duty results in injury to them.4 4
The practical effect of this ruling in the job site context is
that any party who assumes responsibility for job site safety in
its work contract thereby assumes a duty to all workers to provide a safe workplace. Thus, the Kelley court recognized an
exception to the general rule of nonliability based on contract.
This was a change in the law-a change which ensured greater
safety for workers.
3.

Statute

A third change aimed at protecting workers from job site
injuries was addressed in Kelley. This change dealt with a statutory exception to the general rule of nonliability and confirmed
the court's ruling a year earlier in Bayne v. Todd Shipyards
45
Corp.
At issue in Bayne was the construction of former Revised
Code of Washington (RCW) 49.16.030.46 Although this statute,
42. Id. at 333-34, 582 P.2d at 506.
43. See id. at 333, 582 P.2d at 506.
44. Id. at 334, 582 P.2d at 507; see also Manson v. Foutch-Miller, 38 Wash. App.
898, 903, 691 P.2d 236, 239 (1984); Leija v. Materne Brothers, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 825,
828, 664 P.2d 527, 529 (1983).
45. 88 Wash. 2d 917, 568 P.2d 771 (1977).
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.16.030 (repealed 1973) provided as follows:
For the purposes of RCW 49.16.010 through 49.16.150, it shall be the duty of
every employer to furnish a place of work which shall be as safe for workmen
therein as may be reasonable and practicable under the circumstances,
surroundings and conditions, and to furnish and use such safety devices and
safeguards and to adopt and use such practices, means, methods, operations
and processes as under the circumstances, surroundings and conditions are
reasonable and practical in order to render the work and place of work safe,
and to comply with such standards of safety of place of work and such safety
devices and safeguards and such standards and systems of education for safety
as shall be from time to time prescribed for such employer by the director of
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which imposed a duty on employers to adopt safety standards
and maintain a safe workplace, had been in effect since 1919, it
was not until Bayne that the duties the statute created were
construed as extending to all employees lawfully on the premises and not merely to an employer's own employees.4 7
In Kelley, the court confirmed this construction.4 8 Kelley
further held that RCW 49.16.030 created a nondelegable duty
on the part of a general contractor to provide a safe workplace
for employees of subcontractors.4 9
It is important to note that the Kelley court treated the
statutory exception created by RCW 49.16.030 as a wholly separate and independent basis of duty from the common law control exception. 50 An understanding of the distinction between
these two exceptions made by the Kelley court is critical to a
later understanding of the post-WISHA developments in Washington job site liability law.
At this stage of the discussion, the main significance of Kelley is in its confirmation of the Bayne court's extension of the
statutory duty to all job site workers. In Bayne and Kelley, the
Washington Supreme Court showed its growing concern for the
safety of workers by expanding the scope of an existing statutory duty relating to job site liability.
Bayne, however, came too late to save RCW 49.16.030.
Four years earlier, the statute had been repealed and replaced
with WISHA.5 1 Although the legislative history of WISHA is
not extensive, there is enough to indicate that the legislative
intent in passing WISHA was to strengthen and centralize the
regulatory powers of the state in the area of job site safety. The
House Labor Committee's Report to the Speaker's Office
expresses concern that "[e]xisting law as related to industrial
safety and health is fragmented all over the RCWs in numerous
departments and agencies." 52 The Committee stated that the
main purpose of the bill was "to consolidate and update the
labor and industries through the division of safety, or by statute, or by the state
mining board.
47. Bayne, 88 Wash. 2d at 920, 568 P.2d at 773.
48. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 332-33, 582 P.2d at 506.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 334, 582 P.2d at 507.
51. Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, ch. 80, § 28, 1973 Wash.
Laws 212, 234.
52. WASHINGTON STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON LABOR, SENATE BILL
2386, REPORT TO SPEAKER'S OFFICE, at 1 (1973) [hereinafter REPORT TO SPEAxER'S
OFFICE].
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rules and regulations of existing statute under one jurisdictional agency."5 3 The Committee felt that "[m]ore stringent regulatory safety powers are needed."5 4
WISHA itself contains a statement of purpose. 5- The statement declares that it is in the public interest to assure a safe
workplace for all workers, as job site injuries impose a substantial burden not only on the injured workers, but on their
employers as well, in terms of lost production and payment of
benefits under the Industrial Insurance Act (RCW 51).56
Despite the clear intent of the legislature to provide greater
protection for workers with the passage of WISHA, all three
divisions of the Washington Court of Appeals misconstrued the
57
statute as abrogating the tort rights of injured workers.
These courts were correct in ruling that WISHA removed the
general duty imposed on employers by former RCW 49.16.030 to
provide a safe workplace for all employees. The courts erred,
however, in not recognizing a new duty to comply with safety
regulations adopted under WISHA.
The provision of WISHA at issue in all three cases was
RCW 49.17.060.58 In pertinent part, it provides as follows:
Each employer:
(1) Shall furnish to each of his employees a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely
to cause serious injury or death to his employees ....
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 provides as follows:
The legislature finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
conditions of employment impose a substantial burden upon employers and
employees in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and
payment of benefits under the industrial insurance act. Therefore, in the
public interest for the welfare of the people of the state of Washington and in
order to assure, insofar as may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful
working conditions for every man and woman working in the state of
Washington, the legislature in the exercise of its police power, and in keeping
with the mandates of Article 11, section 35 of the state Constitution, declares
its purpose by the provisions of this chapter to create, maintain, continue, and
enhance the industrial safety and health program of the state, which program
of the state, which program shall equal or exceed the standards prescribed by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590).
57. Straw v. Esteem Constr. Co., 45 Wash. App. 869, 728 P.2d 1052 (Div. III 1986);
Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 442, 711 P.2d 1090 (Div. II
1985); Ward v. Ceco Corp., 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (Div. I), review denied, 104
Wash. 2d 1004, 711 P.2d 310 (1985).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060 (1992).
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(2) Shall comply with the rules, regulations, and orders
promulgated under this chapter. 59
A similar administrative code was adopted a year after the
passage of WISHA. It provides in part
(1) Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees a
place of employment free from recognized hazards that are
causing or likely to cause serious injury or death to his
employees.
(2) Every employer shall require safety devices, furnish safeguards, and shall adopt and use practices, methods, operations, and processes which are reasonably adequate to render
such employment and place of employment safe. Every
necessary to protect
employer shall do every thing reasonably
60
the life and safety of employees.
Division One was the first appellate court to construe these
provisions. 61 Because former RCW 49.16.030 had used the
word "workers" in creating the general duty to provide a safe
workplace, while WISHA in RCW 49.17.060(1) used the words
"his employees," Division One concluded that the duty to provide a safe workplace now applied only to an employer's own
employees. 62 Because RCW 49.17.060(2) used the term "safety
of employees," it was construed as creating a broader duty than
subsection (1).63 However, Division One still viewed that duty
as less broad than the duty imposed by former RCW 49.16.030.
Under Division One's reading, the duty to comply with WISHA
regulations was owed to all employees within the "zone of danger" created by a violation. 4 Employees of other contractors
not within the zone of danger were not within the protected
class in Division One's construction of RCW 49.17.060(2).
Division Two concurred with Division One's reading of
RCW 49.17.060(1).65 It differed, though, in its construction of
subsection (2). Division Two held that the duty to comply with
WISHA regulations extends to all employees.6 6 However, Division Two also held that a general contractor did not owe a duty
59. Id.
60. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-040 (1992).
61. Ward, 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814.
62. Id. at 624, 699 P.2d at 818.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 625, 699 P.2d at 818.
65. Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 442, 451, 711 P.2d 1090,
1095 (1985).
66. Id.
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to ensure that all subcontractors complied with WISHA regulations unless the general had the right to control the methods of
the subcontractors' work. 7 Thus, Division Two made a clean
break from Kelley. Under Kelley, a general contractor owed a
duty as a matter of law to ensure compliance with all applicable
safety regulations because his general supervisory functions
constituted per se control.6 8 Interpreting WISHA, Division Two
reintroduced the common law control test to cases involving the
statutory duty of a general contractor with regard to injuries
resulting from safety regulation violations.
Division Two was not alone, though. Division Three gave
RCW 49.17.060 essentially the same reading.6 9 Division Three
construed subsection (1) of the statute as the other two divisions had.7 ° It interpreted subsection (2) largely as Division
Two had, applying the control test to determine whether a general contractor could be held liable for an injury caused by a
WISHA violation.7
Thus, all three divisions construed WISHA as limiting the
tort rights created by former RCW 49.16.030 for workers
injured as a result of a safety regulation violation by an
employer other than their own. Because the Division One case
involved an employee of the general contractor injured by a subcontractor's WISHA violation, its ruling is easier to justify,
although the zone of danger test it applied is somewhat confusing. Divisions Two and Three, however, did not have a strong
legal basis for their rulings. Both rulings contravened the
explicit purpose of WISHA as well as the rule of Kelley, which
the courts should have recognized as controlling-or at least
compelling-despite the change of statute.
What truly makes these cases perplexing is that both were
decided after the Washington Supreme Court handed down its
ruling in Goucher v. J. R. Simplot Co. 72 In Goucher, the court

ruled that RCW 49.17.060 created a two-fold duty.73 The first 7is4
a "general duty" to protect employees from job site hazards.
67. Id. at 452, 711 P.2d at 1095.
68. Kelley v. Howard S.Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 330-33, 582 P.2d 500,
505-06 (1978).
69. Straw v. Esteem Constr. Co., Inc., 45 Wash. App. 869, 728 P.2d 1052 (1986).
70. Id. at 873, 728 P.2d at 1055.
71. Id. at 874-75, 728 P.2d at 1055-56.
72. 104 Wash. 2d 662, 709 P.2d 774 (1985).
73. Id. at 671, 709 P.2d at 779.
74. Id.
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The second is a "specific duty" to comply with WISHA regulations.7 5 The Goucher court ruled that the general duty extends
only to an employer's own employees,7 6 but that the specific
duty applied to all employees on the job site.7 7
Neither Goucher nor the later Washington Supreme Court
case affirming the rule, Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of America,7
reached the issue of whether a general contractor owed a duty
as a matter of law to ensure compliance with all applicable
WISHA regulations, or whether the control test had to be satisfied before a duty was established. Neither case had the appropriate fact pattern. The Goucher court's silence on this issue
allowed the courts of appeals to rule as they did.79
The Washington Supreme Court ultimately addressed the
issue in Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc.8 ° In Stute, a subcontractor's
employee who was injured in a fall from a roof at the job site
sought damages from the general contractor. 8 ' The worker
claimed that the general contractor owed him a duty to provide
the safety devices required by WISHA regulations and that its
failure to do so resulted in his injury. 2 The trial court, apply83
ing the control test, found that no duty was owed the worker.
The worker appealed, but the Commissioner of the Court of
Appeals affirmed, 4 relying on the Division Three construction
of RCW 49.17.060(2) and Washington Administrative Code
(WAC) 296-155-040(2).85
The worker then appealed to the Washington Supreme
Court, arguing that the lower courts' analysis was in conflict
with Goucher and Adkins.8 6 The defendant urged the court to
adopt the approach taken by Division Two by holding that a
general contractor could not be held liable for the subcontrac75. Id.
76. Id. at 672, 709 P.2d at 780.
77. Id.
78. 110 Wash. 2d 128, 750 P.2d 1257 (1988).
79. See Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 442, 451, 711 P.2d
1090, 1095 (1985) (finding that the Goucher court had not reached the question of a
general contractor's responsibility for injuries caused by a subcontractor's violation of
WISHA regulations).
80. 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
81. Id. at 456, 788 P.2d at 546.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-040(2) (1992).
86. Appellant's Brief at 3, Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545
(1990) (No. 56267-9).
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tor's WISHA violation absent a showing that it had a right to
control the subcontractor's work.8 7
The court agreed with the worker's arguments, explicitly
overruling the Division Three approach. 8s The court ruled that
a general contractor's innate supervisory authority is per se
control over the workplace, and the duty to comply with WISHA
standards is placed on the general contractor as a matter of
law.8 9 This duty, the court held, is owed to all employees on the
job site.9 0
The court's reasoning was that this rule better serves the
purpose of WISHA to assure workplace safety9 ' because the
general contractor has control over the property and working
conditions and, therefore, has the greater practical opportunity
and ability to ensure compliance with safety regulations.9 2
This reasoning echoed the court's earlier reasoning in Kelley. In determining the scope of a general contractor's statutory
duty, the Stute court employed general reasoning that was very
similar to that used by the Kelley court to determine the scope
of a general contractor's common law duty. That reasoning was
focused on the degree of control that general contractors have at
job sites. Because of this, there has been some confusion as to
what exactly was done by the Stute court. At first glance, it
appears that Stute applied the common law control test to
determine the scope of the statutory duty.
This interpretation, however, is incorrect. What the Stute
court did was use the innate supervisory authority of the general contractor as a policy reason to justify imposing the statutory duty on general contractors as a matter of law.9 3 Kelley, on
the other hand, viewed this innate supervisory authority as the
determining factor when applying the control test to general
contractors. s4 This difference may be subtle, but it is critical.
To understand the import of this difference, it is important
to recall that the common law control exception to the general
rule of nonliability and the statutory exception were declared in
87. Respondent's Brief at 20-21, Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788
P.2d 545 (1990) (No. 56267-9).
88. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 464, 788 P.2d at 550-51.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 460, 788 P.2d at 548.
91. Id. at 458, 788 P.2d at 547.
92. Id. at 462-63, 788 P.2d at 549-50.
93. Id. at 463, 788 P.2d at 550.
94. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 331, 582 P.2d 500,
505 (1978).
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Kelley to be two wholly independent bases of liability.9 5 If one
reads Stute as applying the common law control test to a determination of statutory duty, one mixes together two bases of liability that had been declared separate in Kelley. Such a reading
either leaves Kelley and Stute in conflict or suggests that Stute
is conceptually flawed.
Neither is correct. The Stute court never questions the Kelley analysis and, in fact, relies heavily on it.9 6 The Stute court
also demonstrates its awareness of the Kelley court's separate
treatment of common law duty and statutory duty. When
addressing the defendant's argument that the control test
should apply to the determination of statutory duty, the Stute
court begins its analysis by noting that "[t]he concept of control
comes from the common law exception to nonliability of an
employer to independent contractors."97
Because the Stute court was aware of the Kelley court's distinction between common law and statutory duties, it would be
unlikely to mix the two by applying the control test to determine the scope of the statutory duty. In fact, the Stute court
explicitly overruled Division Three's attempt to do so.9"
Why did Stute use the concept of control in its analysis of
the statutory duty? The Stute court borrowed the Kelley court's
reasoning for a different purpose. Whereas the Kelley court saw
a general contractor's innate supervisory authority as per se
control sufficient to satisfy the control test and impose the common law duty as a matter of law, Stute viewed this innate
supervisory authority as a policy justification to impose the
statutory duty as a matter of law.
Control is, therefore, not an element of the statutory duty
in Stute. Control is important in the statutory context only in
that a general contractor's control over the workplace is viewed
by the Washington Supreme Court as a reason to place prime
responsibility for WISHA compliance on general contractors.
We have determined what Stute did not do. What, then,
did Stute do? Stute is important for four reasons. First, it held
that general contractors owe a duty to all job site workers to
ensure compliance with all applicable WISHA regulations. Second, it affirmed that this duty is nondelegable. Third, it over95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 330-32, 582 P.2d at 505-06.
Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 463, 788 P.2d at 550.
Id.
Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550-51.
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ruled the lower court's attempts to erode the general
contractors' statutory duty. Fourth, it clarified the subcontractor's statutory duty by holding that, because a subcontractor
lacks the supervisory authority of a general contractor, the subcontractor owes a duty to comply with WISHA only in areas
under its control or where it creates a dangerous condition by
violating WISHA.9 9
The use of the word "control" by the Stute court when discussing a subcontractor's statutory duty has led many to believe
that Stute applied the common law control test to the issue of
statutory duty. However, the court was merely stating the obvious-that a subcontractor, lacking the general contractor's
overall authority, cannot be held liable for all WISHA violations
on the job site, but only for those for which it is directly responsible. The Stute court did not commit the conceptual error of
applying the common law control test to an analysis of a general
contractor's statutory duty.
Accordingly, Stute continued the evolution towards greater
protection for workers under Washington law. Notably, the
Stute court stated that the policy reasons behind the Kelley ruling on former RCW 49.16.030 had not been affected by the
change in statutes.' 0 0 Thus, the Washington Supreme Court
finally set the appellate courts straight-WISHA was not to be
viewed as a step backwards in the protection of workers, but as
a step forward.
Washington courts provided even greater protection for
workers in subsequent decisions. In Husfloen v. MTA Construction, Inc.,' 0 1 Division One extended the Stute rule to cases
involving general contractor/owners. 0 2 In the court's view, a
analogous to a gengeneral contractor/owner was sufficiently
03
eral contractor to justify the extension.
In Weinert v. Bronco National Co.,' 0 4 decided the same day
as Husfloen, Division One extended the rule further, this time
to encompass owner/developers as well.' 0 5 The court found the
position of an owner/developer to be sufficiently analogous to
99. Id. at 461, 788 P.2d at 549.
100. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550.
101. 58 Wash. App. 686, 794 P.2d 859, review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d
325 (1990).
102. Id. at 689, 794 P.2d at 861.
103. Id.
104. 58 Wash. App. 692, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990).
105. Id. at 696, 795 P.2d at 1170.
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that of a general contractor, as an owner/developer "has the
same innate overall supervisory authority and is in the best
position to enforce compliance with safety regulations."" 6
The most recent development in Washington law on this
front occurred in Doss v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.10 7 In Doss, Division Two extended the Stute rule to all job site owners.-0 8 The
court ruled that a job site owner's innate supervisory authority
justified imposing the duty to comply with WISHA standards on
all owners as a matter of law.
This case has generated a great deal of controversy, and
some commentators suggest that it has been implicitly overruled by the Washington Supreme Court in Hennig v. Crosby
Group, Inc. 10 9 In later sections, this Article will address the
controversy by arguing that Doss is still good law.
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF JOB SITE LIABILITY

A.

Summary of the Law

This Article will assume for now-as it will later arguethat Doss is still good law. As a rule of law, the decision completes the picture in Washington regarding statutory exceptions
to the general rule of nonliability. A statutory exception to the
rule of nonliability was created by the state legislature in RCW
49.17.060. WISHA created a two-fold duty. 1 0 The first is a
general duty under subsection (1) to protect employees from job
site hazards."" The second is a specific duty under subsection
(2) to comply with WISHA regulations. 1 12 The general duty
extends only to an employer's own employees, 11 134 but the specific
duty applies to all employees on the job site.
Under the specific duty clause, several types of employers
owe a duty, as a matter of law, to ensure WISHA compliance by
all subcontractors. This group includes general contractors,"
106. Id.
107. 60 Wash. App. 125, 803 P.2d 4, review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d
583 (1991).
108. Id. at 128-29, 803 P.2d at 6.
109. 116 Wash. 2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991).
110. Goucher v. J. R. Simplot Co., 104 Wash. 2d 662, 671, 709 P.2d 774, 779 (1985).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 672-73, 709 P.2d at 780.
114. Id.
115. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545, 550 (1990).
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general contractor/owners," 6 owner/developers," 7 and all job
site owners."' In the case of subcontractors, however, the duty
is limited to WISHA regulations that cover the subcontractor's
work. 1 19
Under the general duty clause, a duty is placed on all
employers to provide and maintain a safe workplace. 20 This
duty, however, extends only to the employer's own employees.' 2 ' Thus, there is no statutory exception under which an
employer on the job site
injured employee can sue 2another
2
violation.'
WISHA
absent a
That is not to say that if there is no WISHA violation, there
is no duty owed to the employees of other contractors. As noted
previously, an employer may contractually assume a duty to
the employees of another contractor to maintain a safe

workplace. 123
Washington courts recognize a contractual exception to the
rule of nonliability when a party accepts an affirmative duty to
provide safety measures in its contract.124 A general contractor
contractually assuming responsibility for total job site safety
thereby assumes a duty to all workers to provide a safe
125
workplace.
The common law control exception, like the contractual
exception, may still come into play in cases in which there is no
WISHA violation. Where the employer retains at least some
degree of control over the mode of another contractor's work,
the employer still has a duty, within the scope of that control, to
provide a safe place to work for the other contractor's
12 6
employees.
116. Husfloen v. MTA Constr., Inc., 58 Wash. App. 686, 689, 794 P.2d 859, 861,
review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d 325 (1990).
117. Weinert v. Bronco Nat'l. Co., 58 Wash. App. 692, 696, 795 P.2d 1167, 1170
(1990).
118. Doss v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 125, 128-29, 803 P.2d 4, 6, review
denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991).
119. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 461, 788 P.2d at 549.
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060(1) (1992).
121. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 457, 788 P.2d at 547.
122. An injured employee is also precluded from suing his own employer. WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1992).

123. See supra section II.B.2.
124. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 334, 582 P.2d 500,
507 (1978).
125. Id.
126. Fenimore v. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 94, 549 P.2d 483, 489 (1976).
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The control test is still alive in Washington law, but it is
important to note that it is a common law exception to the rule
of nonliability. The control test no longer applies to cases
involving statutorily created duties. This is how the law on job
site liability stands in Washington.
B.

Hennig and Kennedy
12
Some commentators 1 27 and at least one court opinion
have suggested that the three court of appeals' decisions
expanding Stute-especially Doss-have been eroded by the
Washington Supreme Court ruling in Hennig v. Crosby Group,
Inc. 129 and the Division One ruling in Kennedy v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. 130 These cases, however, are entirely consistent with
Stute and its progeny. The misconception seems to be the result
of a misreading of Hennig and the Kennedy court's failure to
distinguish the facts of its case from the facts in Doss.
In both Hennig and Kennedy, an injured employee of an
independent contractor sought damages from the job site
owner. 13 1 Both courts ruled that the control test had to be
applied to the owner to determine whether it could be held liable. 13 2 It is this application of the control test to job site owners
that led to the misconception that Hennig and Kennedy were in
conflict with prior law. The Kennedy court itself perceived a
conflict, stating that it was partially disagreeing with the Doss

ruling. 133
There is, however, no conflict because neither Hennig nor
Kennedy dealt with a WISHA violation, whereas Stute and its
progeny all based their rulings on the fact that a WISHA violation was involved. This distinction is critical because if the
injury is not the result of a safety regulation violation, there is
no statutory exception to the rule of nonliability. Only if the
worker's injury is caused by a WISHA violation does the specific
duty imposed by RCW 49.17.060(2) apply. Absent a WISHA
violation, the only statutory exception is the general duty
127. Duff, supra note 18, at 371.
128. George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 67 Wash.
App. 468, 473, 836 P.2d 851, 853 (1992).
129. 116 Wash. 2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991).
130. 62 Wash. App. 839, 816 P.2d 75 (1991).
131. Hennig, 116 Wash. 2d at 133, 802 P.2d at 791; Kennedy, 62 Wash. App. at 841,

816 P.2d
132.
816 P.2d
133.

at 76.
Hennig, 116 Wash. 2d at 134, 802 P.2d at 792; Kennedy, 62 Wash. App. at 854,
at 83.
Kennedy, 62 Wash. App. at 854, 816 P.2d at 83.
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imposed by RCW 49.17.060(1). This duty, however, extends
only to an employer's own employees. Thus, an employee of an
independent contractor could not maintain an action against
the job site owner based on this statutory exception.
Hennig and Kennedy are not applying the same law as the
Stute line of cases. The Stute cases applied a statutory exception to the rule of nonliability. In Hennig and Kennedy, there
was no statutory exception to apply, nor was there an exception
based on contract. Both courts, then, took the proper course of
action and looked to a common law exception-the control test.
Because Hennig and Kennedy were not decided under the same
exception, they are not in conflict with the earlier cases.
The circumstances surrounding the Hennig decision indicate that the Washington Supreme Court, and the attorneys
arguing the case, understood the distinction between Hennig
and the Stute cases. Hennig did not overrule Doss, and in fact
did not even cite the case. A search of the appellate record
reveals that the three parties involved in the appeal wrote six
separate briefs to the court, and not one mentions Doss or Stute.
Stute is not cited in the court's opinion, indicating that the Hennig court understood that it was dealing with a different issue
of law.
Particularly compelling is the fact that five months after
Hennig was decided, the Washington Supreme Court denied the
petition for review that had been submitted in the Doss case. 3 4
It is possible to argue that Hennig did not overrule Doss
because Hennig and Doss were decided in the same month.
However, if the Washington Supreme Court had felt that the
Doss holding conflicted with its holding in Hennig, it presumably would have taken the opportunity to reverse Doss. The
court allowed Doss to stand, however, indicating that the court
perceived no conflict between the two decisions.
Therefore, Doss is still good law. Job site owners still owe a
duty, as a matter of law, to ensure that all contractors comply
with WISHA.

134. 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991).
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CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF JOB

SITE LIABILITY

A. The Place of Stute and Its Progeny in the Evolution
The Stute line of cases represent the latest step in the
evolution of Washington job site liability law. These cases
reflect the growing awareness of lawmakers of the public interest in protecting the safety and health of the state's workforce.
By holding both general contractors and job site owners responsible for injuries resulting from violations of safety regulations,
Washington courts have ensured greater compliance. This is
clearly consonant with the historical trend of job site liability
law.
Moreover, the Stute cases are consistent with the theories
underlying the common law rules upon which they are built.
The basis of the general rule of nonliability is the independence
of the relationship between the employer and the independent
contractor. 135 The theory underlying the common law control
exception is that this independence is vitiated once the
employer assumes the right to control the method of the
independent contractor's work. 136 What the Stute cases reflect
is that in the modern workplace, this independence no longer
exists as it once did, especially in the context of construction
work. The work is so interconnected, and the various contractors are so interdependent on safety issues, that to rely on the
lack of privity between the employee of a subcontractor and the
general contractor or owner places form over substance.
Arguments to the contrary generally look to the common
law control exception as if it were some oasis in the desert of
nonliability and as if injured workers who did not fit within it
were simply out of luck. These arguments, however, ignore the
fact that the control exception is merely one of several exceptions to nonliability. There are others. 37 Further, the statutory exception exists apart from the control exception. The
to
court in Stute rejected the attempt to use a control analysis 38
limit the scope of the general contractor's statutory duty.'
135. Larson v. American Bridge Co., 40 Wash. 224, 228, 82 P. 294, 295 (1905).
136. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965).
137. An employer can be held liable for its own negligence. Tauscher v. Puget
Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274, 281, 635 P.2d 426, 430 (1981). An employer
can also be held liable for negligent hiring. Id. Another exception exists for inherently
dangerous work. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 332, 582
P.2d 500, 506 (1978).
138. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545, 550-51 (1990).
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Under Stute, the common law control analysis does not limit a
general contractor's statutory duty because the general contractor's status and authority warrant placing the duty on it as a
matter of law. Thus, Stute shifted the inquiry from the existence of a duty to a breach of that duty. That shift in focus is a
significant step towards providing greater protection for
workers.
B.

Stute and the Legislative Intent Behind WISHA

The Stute cases were not carving out new common law
exceptions, but were interpreting statutory exceptions created
in WISHA. Thus, the Stute cases' consistency with common law
precedent, while it bolsters their reasoning, is not necessary.
Stute and its progeny were interpreting a statute that had chosen worker safety over common law concepts. In creating
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability, the legislature
was, in effect, stating that worker safety took precedence over
such ancient and elusive common law concepts such as privity,
independence of the relationship, and even control. In construing these statutes as imposing a nondelegable duty on all owners and general contractors to comply with safety regulations,
the Stute cases were in conformity with the legislative intent
behind WISHA.
In WISHA, the legislature expressly voiced concern "that
personal injuries and illnesses arising out of conditions of
employment impose a substantial burden upon employers and
employees in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical
expenses, and payment of benefits under the industrial insurance act." 1 39 By enacting WISHA, the legislature hoped to
"assure, insofar as may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful working conditions for every man and woman working in the
state of Washington."1 4 °
Worker safety was the primary concern of the legislature.
To assure worker safety, the legislature gave power to the
Washington Department of Labor and Industries to enact safety
standards. For these standards to have the intended effect,
employer compliance is necessary. The primary concern of the
Stute, Husfloen, Weinert, and Doss courts was to ensure such
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).
140. Id.
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compliance. 14 1 The courts felt that the best way to ensure compliance was to impose civil liability for injuries resulting from
WISHA violations on employers with innate supervisory
authority. 142 It was the belief of the courts that employers with
such authority have the opportunity to ensure compliance on
the part of all subcontractors. 4 3 Thus, the Stute decisions, by
under
giving practical effect to the standards promulgated
1 44
WISHA, further the stated purpose of the statute.
The legislative history reveals that, in addition to strengthening safety standards, the legislature was concerned with consolidating them.' 4 5 Prior to WISHA, safety standards were
"fragmented all over the RCWs in numerous departments and
agencies. 1146 The legislature sought to "consolidate and update
47
the rules and regulations under one jurisdictional agency."'
In so doing, the legislature sought greater efficiency in the
enforcement of safety standards. The Stute cases are in line
with this intent because they rejected the use of the piecemeal
control test to determine statutory duty in favor of the more certain innate supervisory authority approach. With the control
test, the degree of control is the determinative factor. Under
that approach, every case must be dealt with individually, as
the degree of control will vary from party to party, case to case.
As the court of appeals' decisions show, the result is inconsistent rules of liability, uncertainty, and injustice.
There is clearly more certainty under the innate supervisory authority approach. Tedious case-by-case application is no
longer necessary because a general contractor or owner knows
it is liable as a matter of law. This furthers the stated purpose
of WISHA because general contractors and owners, knowing
they can be held liable for injuries resulting from WISHA viola141. See Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 461-63, 788 P.2d at 549-50; Doss v. ITT Rayonier,
Inc., 60 Wash. App. 125, 127, 803 P.2d 4, 5, review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d
583 (1991); Husfloen v. MTA Constr., Inc., 58 Wash. App. 686, 689-90, 794 P.2d 859,
861, review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d 325 (1990); Weinert v. Bronco Nat'l
Co., 58 Wash. App. 692, 696, 795 P.2d 1167, 1169-70 (1990).
142. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 461, 788 P.2d at 549.
143. Id. at 462, 788 P.2d at 550.
144. See id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550. The above-cited cases also have the effect of
protecting the workers' compensation fund. If a third-party defendant is found liable for
a job site injury, the fund is partially repaid. It is sound public policy that those who are
responsible for harm to injured workers bear the cost of compensating those workers
and repaying the fund.
145. REPORT To SPEAKER'S OFFICE, supra note 52, at 1.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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tions, will presumably protect their interests by demanding and
inspecting for compliance from all subcontractors.
The enhanced certainty also addresses the legislature's call
for consolidation and efficiency. The Stute approach is more
efficient, more economical, and easier in application. By eliminating the piecemeal approach of the nebulous control test in
most cases, the Stute approach furthers the legislative purpose
of ensuring greater efficiency in safety standard enforcement.
The declared purpose of WISHA is to "create, maintain,
continue, and enhance the industrial safety and health program
of the state, which program shall equal or exceed the standards
prescribed by the [OSH Act]." 1 48 These words further emphasize the intent of the legislature to provide greater protection
for workers. The gravity with which the legislature apparently
viewed the safety question more than justifies the approach
taken by the Stute cases to ensure WISHA compliance. The legislature hoped to ensure worker safety by any reasonable
means possible. The Stute cases introduced reasonable means
of accomplishing this goal.
Because the state legislature chose to adopt standards that
exceed those of the federal government, opponents of the Stute
rules are precluded from arguing that the new Washington
approach is invalid because it goes beyond the approach taken
by the federal courts. The federal courts construe the OSH Act.
Washington courts address a more stringent regulatory scheme.
Thus, the limits of the federal court rules are irrelevant. The
intent of the state legislature was to go a step further.
In addressing the arguments of those opposed to the Stute
scheme, it is important to note that some commentators do not
argue with the Stute ruling as it applies to general contractors
in the Stute case itself, but are opposed to the extension of the
Stute ruling to job site owners in Doss, to owner/developers in
Weinert, and to owner/general contractors in Husfloen.14 9 Two
points about legislative intent must be addressed specifically to
those commentators.
One is that the WISHA definition of "employer" is comprehensive enough to include owners as well as general contractors. 15 0 The statute does not differentiate between different
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).

149. Duff, supra note 18, at 371-72.
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.020(3) (1992).
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types of employers. 15 1 Thus, the duties imposed by RCW
49.17.060 apply equally to all types of employers. If the legislature had meant for job site owners to be less accountable, it
could have separately defined owners or general contractors. It
did not. The duties it imposed, therefore, must be applied
uniformly.
The second point is that the administrative rules adopted
pursuant to WISHA impose upon all employers the duty to "do
every thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety
of employees. " 1 52 Note that this code refers to employees in general, as RCW 49.17.060(2) does. Thus, the duty extends to all
employees. If job site owners were not held accountable for all
injuries resulting from WISHA violations, this provision would
have no practical effect on them. Owners who are not general
contractors often have none of their own employees on the job
site because every worker is employed by one of the contractors.
Under the control test, some job site owners would not have to
take any steps to ensure worker safety. In effect, they would be
getting a free ride merely by turning a blind eye to safety issues
and passing the responsibility to the general contractor.
Surely, this is not the result the legislature sought when it
adopted WISHA. Moreover, this result would render WAC 295155-040(4)(c) 5 3 utterly meaningless as regards to those owners
who ignored safety measures. This would violate the most basic
rules of statutory construction. 1 54 The extension of the Stute
rule to job site owners is consistent with legislative intent and is
necessary to give full practical effect to WAC 296-155-040(4)(c).
The extension of the Stute rule beyond general contractors
thus furthers the policies underlying WISHA. In fact, the
stated purpose of WISHA and the legislative history behind its
enactment indicate that its purposes are fully served only if all
151. Id.
152. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-040(4)(c) (1992).
153. Id.
154. See Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 102-03, 829
P.2d 746, 751 (1992) (holding that statutes in derogation of common law should be
strictly construed and that statutes should not be interpreted in such a manner as to

render any portion thereof meaningless, superfluous, or questionable), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1044 (1993); Estate of O'Brien v. Robinson, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 918, 749 P.2d 154,
157 (1988) (holding that a statute is construed in such a manner as to avoid rendering
meaningless a word or portion thereof); Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles,
107 Wash. 2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1986) (emphasizing legislative intent,
relation of statute to other provisions, and interpreting a statute so as not to render any
portion meaningless, superfluous, or questionable).
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job site owners owe the statutory duty as a matter of law. The
rulings of Stute and all its progeny should remain good law.
C.

The Benefits of the Stute Rule to Employers
and Employees

In passing WISHA, the legislature sought to benefit
employers as well as employees.' 55 Both Stute itself and the
court of appeals cases expanding its ruling fit this balanced
approach because the reasoning behind these cases and the
practical effects gained by the rulings seek to benefit employers
as well as employees.
In making this argument, it is necessary to first argue that
the reasoning underlying Stute applies with equal force to the
situations that existed in Husfloen, Weinert, and Doss. Those
who agree with the Stute ruling, but not with the cases that
expanded it, should note that the Stute court did not expressly
limit its rule to general contractors. Nothing in the court's language indicates that it viewed the rule this narrowly.
In fact, the reasoning used by the Stute court indicated that
the rule could be expanded when the public policy of protecting
workers called for it. The court imposed the duty as a matter of
law on general contractors because, as a practical matter, general contractors have both the opportunity and the ability to
ensure safety regulation compliance from all of the subcontractors. The general contractor can include the cost of assuring a
safe workplace in its bid to the owners. It can also require that
subcontractors include the cost of safety in their bids. Placing
furthe prime responsibility for safety on the general contractor
16
thers the purpose of WISHA to protect all workers.'
This reasoning applies with equal force to job site owners.
As the owner of the property where the work is being done, the
job site owner has the legal authority to ensure compliance. As
the party who controls the purse strings, the owner has the
practical authority to ensure WISHA compliance. The job site
owner can and should insist that all of the contractors observe
the state standards. The owner can require safety provisions in
the prime contract and in each subcontract. The owner can
require that each contractor include the cost of safety in its bid.
The owner can fire or withhold payment from a contractor who
does not comply. This authority gives the owner both the oppor155. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).
156. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 462-63, 788 P.2d 545, 550 (1990).
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tunity and the ability to ensure compliance. The role of the job
site owner is analogous to that of the general contractor in the
context of the Stute court's reasoning.
Moreover, the Stute court was concerned that at least one
party on each work site be responsible for job site safety." 7 In
Stute, this responsibility was placed on the general contractor.
In many cases, however, there is no general contractor. This is
especially true outside of the construction context, but even in
construction there has been a recent trend towards hiring "construction managers," rather than general contractors. On some
sites, as in Husfloen, the owner is the general contractor. On
other sites, such as in Weinert, the owner is a land developer
who hires subcontractors, but no general contractor. In some
situations, as in Doss, a subcontractor is hired to perform some
specific maintenance or repair task on a site that had been previously constructed, and there is no general contractor. In situations such as these, the purposes of WISHA-as viewed by
Stute-can be furthered only by placing responsibility for safety
as a matter of law on a party other than the general contractor.
Job site owners are the only logical and practical choice.
There is always a job site owner. The owner always has authority. The owner, if he can afford to hire subcontractors, presumably has the monetary resources. The owner signs the contracts
and the checks, and therefore can insist on safety standard compliance. With general contractors nonexistent in many contexts, imposing liability on owners as a matter of law is the best
way to assure that every worker in the state has the benefit of
the protection of the WISHA standards. Someone must be
responsible, and job site owners are, as a practical matter, the
best choice. The reasoning of Stute, easily extends to, and in
fact may best apply to, job site owners.
The approach taken by the Stute line of cases should not be
viewed with hostility by owners and general contractors. It
serves to benefit employers as well as employees. Greater
worker safety benefits everyone. Employee injuries cost
employers dearly, in terms of lost production and payment of
premiums under the Industrial Insurance Act. 158 With responsibility for safety placed with certainty on at least one party on
the job site, safety regulations are more likely to be met, which
157. Id. at 463-64, 788 P.2d at 550.
158. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04-.98 (1992).
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will save all employers from the costs associated with employee
injuries.
Employers also benefit, as do injured employees, from the
certainty that the Stute approach brings to the law of job site
liability. In the modern work world, the control test is an inefficient white elephant. Its piecemeal approach results in higher
court costs and confusion on the part of owners and contractors
as to their potential liability. Under the control test, an
employer does not know for certain what actions would subject
it to liability. Anticipating potential liability for any job would
be impossible. Under the Stute approach, general contractors
and owners know they are responsible for WISHA compliance,
and subcontractors know they are responsible in their work
area. The parties can figure their potential liability and prepare for it. This will save employers from unexpected liabilities.
It will also save employers and injured employees the
expense and inconvenience of a lengthy lawsuit. With liability
more certain, injured employees will know which parties to pursue and which not to pursue. Cases will settle faster. Fewer
appeals will be necessary. The costs of defending lawsuits
should actually go down for employers under the new scheme.
The Stute approach also spreads responsibility better than
the control test. This is especially true when the expansion of
the Stute rule to job site owners is taken into account. The
approach of the Stute line of cases makes a greater number of
parties potentially liable for job site injuries. Owners and general contractors are liable for certain, and the subcontractor
whose WISHA violation resulted in the injury is liable as well.
This spreads the costs of the injury out among a greater number
of parties, thereby reducing the burden on employers, making it
easier for the employee to make a full recovery, and better
ensuring reimbursement of the state workers' compensation
fund. With more parties potentially liable, there should also be
greater compliance with safety standards. Injuries are thereby
reduced, which in turn reduces the overall cost of industrial
insurance premiums for all employers.
Expanding the Stute rule to job site owners also reduces the
burden on general contractors. Were general contractors solely
responsible for safety, the costs for liability insurance would be
unfairly weighted against them. Contractors might become
reluctant to be general contractors.
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Moreover, owners could shrug off responsibility by intentionally abdicating control over safety. Such apathy is not what
the legislature sought when it enacted WISHA. Owners should
be encouraged to become more, not less, involved in the safety of
the jobs they initiate.
Taking this point to its logical conclusion, owners could,
given the out allowed them by the control test, undertake
projects with no accountability whatsoever. This is unfair to
society in general. Those reaping the benefits of the state's
workforce could ignore the safety of those workers and receive
benefits without sharing the risk. The less aggressively an
owner pursued safety, the less it would be exposed to risk.
Surely, fairness demands that the owner who is less concerned
with safety should face greater risks.
Making owners liable also indirectly forces contractors to
be more responsible about safety. Knowing they are legally
accountable, owners will make WISHA compliance an issue
when they hire contractors. Contractors with better safety
records will get more jobs. Again, everybody benefits.
Some commentators argue that the Stute approach is
unfair because of the recent erosion of indemnification rights by
the courts. 159 This argument, however, ignores the fact that
while the courts were reducing these contract rights, the state
legislature was compensating by creating greater contribution
1
Thus, if the injured worker makes
rights among tortfeasors. aO
only one responsible party a defendant to a lawsuit, that party
can seek contribution from the other responsible parties even if
indemnification is not allowed. 1 6 1 The Stute approach remains
balanced, even in the face of disappearing indemnification
rights.
This balance is a plus. The legislature did not mention the
fair and equitable distribution of liability as a goal of WISHA.
WISHA is for the safety of workers, not for the protection of
employer's rights as to one another when that safety breaks
down. The balance of the Stute approach was not called for by
the legislature and is, therefore, a bonus to employers.
As a final word on the issue of fairness, some have
expressed concern that job site owners who are less sophisticated or less wealthy will be hurt by the extension of the Stute
159. Duff, supra note 18, at 374-75.
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050 (1992).
161. Id.
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rule to them. However, if owners have little money and no
insurance, it is doubtful that an injured worker will pursue
them aggressively as defendants. Moreover, it is sound policy
to make all who wish to profit from the labor of workers responsible for providing a safe workplace for those workers. It does
not further safety to grant impecunious and ignorant owners
relief from the duty to ensure WISHA compliance.
In addition to being more fair than the control test, the
Stute approach will have a greater practical impact. Under the
control test, defendants would attempt to make fine semantic
distinctions about their roles on the job site in an attempt to
escape liability. General contractors would portray themselves
as "construction managers" to escape liability. Owner/developers and owner/general contractors would claim to be simple
owners, physically absent from the job site and therefore not in
control of worker safety.
Such semantic quibbling reveals the true problem with the
control test-it is an unnecessary waste of court time and therefore counterproductive to the general goal of judicial economy.
Its piecemeal approach practically precludes the quick resolution of any job site injury. The greater certainty of the Stute
approach eliminates this problem.
It should be pointed out as a final note that the control test
and the Stute approach are more similar in terms of application
than opponents of the Stute approach would like to admit. The
difference is semantic, with "innate supervisory authority" taking the place of "right to control" as the term of art. What is
authority if not the right to control? In application, they are
basically the same. The Stute line of cases acknowledges that,
as a practical matter, general contractors and owners do and
should always have the right and responsibility to control the
safety aspects of a job.
In terms of practical effect, however, authority and control
are very different. The piecemeal control test creates more
uncertainty than it does safety. Only by holding the parties in
charge accountable for injuries resulting from WISHA violations is there any practical way we can expect an improvement
in the frequency with which those standards are observed.
V.

CONCLUSION

The history of job site liability in Washington has been that
of a slow, but constant, evolution towards a greater recognition
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that the safety of workers is crucial to the welfare of the state
as a whole. The rule of Stute and its expansion by the courts of
appeals is merely the most recent step in that evolution. The
Stute approach is a good rule of law. It serves to benefit both
employers and employees, it is fair and balanced, and it is consonant with the purposes of WISHA.

